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Abstract
We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were al-
lowed and free of stigma. Two parties competing in a binary election may purchase
votes in a sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign
promises (platforms) that are contingent upon the outcome of the election. We an-
alyze the role of the parties’ budget constraints and voter preferences. For instance,
if only campaign promises are allowed, then the winning party depends not only on
the relative size of the budgets, but also on the excess support of the party with the
a priori majority, where the excess support is measured in terms of the (minimal)
total utility of supporting voters who are in excess of the majority needed to win.
If up front vote buying is permitted, and voters care directly about how they vote
(as a legislator would), then the determination of the winning party depends on
a weighted comparison of the two parties’ budgets plus half of the total utility
of their supporting voters. These results suggest that vote buying can lead to an
ineﬃcient party winning in equilibrium. We find that under some circumstances,
if parties budgets are raised through donations, then vote buying can be eﬃcient.
Finally, we provide some results on vote buying in the face of uncertainty.
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1 Introduction
The practice of vote buying appears in many societies and organizations, and in diﬀerent
forms. Obvious examples include direct payments to a voter, donations to a legislator’s
campaign by a special interest group, the buying of the voting shares of a stock, and
the promise of specific programs or payments to voters conditional on the election of a
candidate. While we generally think of the trade of goods as being welfare improving,
this view is not always held with respect to the buying and selling of votes. In some
forms vote buying is considered perfectly legal, while in others it is considered illegal,
immoral and undesirable. Our purpose in this paper is to explore the consequences of
vote buying. Given this purpose, we consider vote buying in a world in which it is allowed
and completely free of stigma in order to see how it might function.
We examine a number of questions about a world with vote buying.
• How do the parameters of the agents–voters’ preferences over outcomes and over
how they vote, and bidders’ budgets–aﬀect the outcome of the election?
• How does the institutional environment–whether parties can purchase votes with
up-front payments or can only make platform promises that are contingent on the
outcome of the election–aﬀect the outcome?
• Is the outcome of a vote buying election eﬃcient, and how is the answer aﬀected
by allowing bidders’ budgets to be raised from donations by the voters?
In order to address these questions, we consider the following model. Two parties
are each interested in obtaining a majority of votes while spending as little as possible,
subject to not exceeding their respective budgets. Voters have preferences over which
party wins, as well as any money payments that they get from the parties. We examine a
scenario in which parties compete in up-front vote buying (where payment is contingent
on the vote but not on the outcome) as well as one in which the parties may only
compete in platforms (promises that are contingent upon the outcome of the election,
but not upon the actual vote). In both scenarios the parties make oﬀers in a sequential
and alternating bidding process, and they are fully informed about each other’s budgets
and voters’ preferences. A voter’s payoﬀs result from the payment she gets in exchange
for her vote and utility that is related to her fundamental preferences over outcomes.
The latter can be justified by assuming either that she perceives a positive, even if small,
probability of being pivotal, or that she has some preference for voting for the preferred
outcome even if this has no aﬀect on the outcome.
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In a large anonymous election we expect the utility term to be small in either case.
So, in such an election with up-front vote buying, the winner is the party with the larger
budget and, due to the sequential nature of the bidding, the winner ends up paying
very little to the voters. In contrast, when the parties compete only through campaign
promises (platforms), then the identity of the winner also depends significantly on voters’
preferences and substantial promises end up being made to a subset of the voters near
the median voter.1 These voters are the cheapest to sway from one party to the other
and they continue to be so throughout the bidding process.
While the above analysis implies that the outcome of the election could generally
be Pareto ineﬃcient, we argue that this depends on the source of the parties’ budgets.
If voters can contribute to the budgets of the parties and equilibrium contributions are
monotonic in how much voters like each party, then the party that maximizes the total
utility of the voters is the winner.
The analysis of vote buying is more complex in situations where voters care non-
negligibly about how they vote. This variation is particularly relevant for voting in a
legislature in the presence of lobbying. In this interpretation, the parties are two opposing
interest groups competing to acquire the votes of legislators. The voters are legislators
whose voting preferences are explained by popularity of the two alternative positions
among their constituencies, which in turn aﬀect their electability (see the literature dis-
cussion below for related work on this subject). The problem of identifying the winner in
terms of the budgets and preferences turns out to be hard in this case and we have only
solved a special case were budgets are suﬃciently large. An interesting insight concerns
the tradeoﬀ between a favorable shift in preference towards a party and a change in its
budget. Roughly speaking, when budgets are large, increasing any voter’s preference for
X over Y by the equivalent of $1 has the same aﬀect on whether X will win as increasing
party X’s budget by $0.5. In this sense, money is worth substantially more to a party
than being liked by an equivalent amount. That money is (weakly) better than being
liked by an equivalent amount is intuitive as it is more flexible, but note that the result
holds even for voters who in the end receive money from the winning party. If the op-
ponent’s behavior is held fixed then the winning party is indiﬀerent between increasing
such a voter’s preference by $1 and increasing the budget by an equal amount. Never-
theless, the winner is determined by comparing a party’s budgetary advantage with half
1There are multiple equilibria in this case; the conclusion that substantial payments are made to
near-median voters holds for what we think is a “natural” class of equilibria. These are also the only
equilibria in a perturbed version of the game in which there is uncertainty about the budgets.
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the disadvantage in terms of how much it is liked by the voters.
We also allow for voters’ preferences to be unknown to the parties, in which case
they cannot be “targeted.” Hence both in the case where votes are purchased up front,
and in the case of campaign promises, oﬀers are distributed uniformly across voters. In
the case of vote buying this contrasts with the preceding discussion in that increasing
the distribution of preferences so that the (expected) median voter’s preference for vot-
ing for X over Y by $1 has the same aﬀect on who wins as increasing X’s budget by
$N/2, where N is the number of voters. (If the opponent makes no oﬀers, and if the
expected median voter’s preferences changed from barely liking X to preferring Y by $1,
then to guarantee a majority X could oﬀer N/2 voters $1.) In the case of campaign
promises the uncertainty over preferences results in payments being uniform instead of
being concentrated on a subset of “swing” voters near the median.
Three diﬀerent lines of related literature are the study of Colonel Blotto games, the
political science literature on lobbying (e.g., Groseclose and Snyder (1996)), campaign
promises (Myerson 1993), and vote buying (e.g., Kochin and Kochin (1998)), and the
finance literature on corporate control and takeover battles (e.g., Grossman and Hart
(1988), Harris and Raviv (1988)). Section 7.3 discusses the relations of our work to those
literatures in more detail.
2 A Model of Vote Buying
Two “parties,” X and Y , compete in an election with an odd number, N , of voters.
As mentioned in the introduction, we may think of these parties as candidates in the
election, or in other applications as lobbyists or interest groups that support diﬀerent
sides of an issue to be voted on by some group of voters.
2.1 The Vote Buying Game
Prior to the election the parties try to influence the voting. Parties have two methods of
influencing voters:
(1) Up-front payments: a binding agreement that gives the party full control of the
vote in exchange for an up-front payment given to the voter.
(2) Campaign promises: a promise that has to be honored by the party only if it is
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elected and the voter maintains full control of the vote.2
The bidding is an alternating oﬀers process. Party k in its turn announces how much
it oﬀers in the form of an up-front payment pki ≥ 0 to voter i for her vote, and how much
it promises to pay voter i if it is elected, denoted cki ≥ 0. A fresh oﬀer (or promise) made
to a voter cannot be lower than those previously made by the same party to the same
voter. There is a smallest money unit ε > 0, so oﬀers can only be made in multiples of ε.
The parties finance their up-front payments and campaign promises out of budgets
denoted BX and BY . The total of the up-front payments and campaign promises that
a party would have to pay at any stage of the game, assuming that the game were to
end at that stage and that party were to win, cannot exceed its budget. At each point
in time, given the up-front oﬀers and campaign promises, there is a unique party that
each voter will sell her vote to (as we discuss below). If party k’s up-front oﬀer pki has
been outbid by the other party, so that voter i currently prefers to sell their vote to the
other party, then party k does not have to count this up-front oﬀer against its budget.
However, all campaign promises (platforms) do need to be honored by the winner and
thus count against the budget.
The budgets might derive from the state’s resources that are controlled by the winner,
or from donations. Either interpretation is consistent with budgets used for financing
campaign promises and up-front vote buying. We discuss these interpretations further
in section 7.1.
When a party makes oﬀers and promises, it observes the past oﬀers and promises
received by each voter. The preference of a party is to win at minimal cost. We can
think of this as a situation where party k’s utility of winning is W k − t and its utility of
losing is −t, where t ≤ Bk is the total of all payments incurred by party k and W k ≥ Bk
is k’s value for winning. Without loss of generality, given that payments must be in
multiples of ε, we round budgets down to the nearest multiple of ε as any remainder can
never be bid. The bidding process ends when two rounds go by without any change in
the oﬀers and promises. Once the bidding process ends, voters simultaneously tender
their votes to the parties. The party that collects more than half the votes wins.
Initially, we consider the full information version of the game where the parties’
budgets and the voters’ preferences are known to the parties when they bid. Later, we
relax those assumptions.
2Another natural form of strategy that the parties might use is one where an up front promise is
made and a vote purchased and controlled, but where the payment oﬀered is contingent on winning.
This is discussed in section 7.2).
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2.2 Voter Behavior
The voters are not formally modeled as players in this game, but instead are assumed to
sell their votes according to the following simple rule. Each voter i is characterized by
a parameter Ui that is interpreted as the diﬀerence between the utility she obtains from
X’s victory in the election and the utility she obtains from Y ’s victory. Ui can, of course,
be either positive or negative. We label voters so that Ui is non-increasing in i. Under
this labeling, we refer to m = (N + 1) /2 as the median voter.
If voter i faces final payment promises pki and final campaign promises c
k
i from parties
k = X and Y respectively, she will sell her vote to X if
pXi + α(Ui + c
X
i ) > p
Y
i + αc
Y
i , (1)
where α is a parameter in (0, 1]. Voter i will tender to Y if the strict inequality is reversed.
To avoid dealing with ties, which add nothing of interest to the analysis, we assume that
for all i, the values Ui/2 and αUi/2 are not multiples of ε.3
As we have just said, the voters are not modeled as players. Nevertheless, let us
discuss their presumed behavior. Here, Ui + cX and cY reflect the relative values of
the final election outcomes. These are weighted by α which represents a voter’s relative
preference weight on final outcome versus up-front payments. So the voter is assumed to
vote for the party that yields total higher payoﬀs when contingent payments are weighted
by α. Thus, if we assume this truly represents their preferences then (1) is analogous
to voting according to preferences which is a weakly dominant strategy in such binary
elections.
To better understand the possible interpretations of α, let us look at a more general
comparison for the voter, between
pXi + a
¡
Ui + cXi
¢
+Pr (X wins | vote X) ¡Ui + cXi ¢+Pr (Y wins | vote X) ¡cYi ¢
and
pYi + a
¡
cYi
¢
+Pr (X wins | vote Y ) ¡Ui + cXi ¢+Pr (Y wins | vote Y ) ¡cYi ¢ . (2)
Here the voter is explicitly accounting for their probability of aﬀecting the outcome of
the voting, and also has another parameter a ≥ 0 which indicates their relative utility
3The alternative to ruling out ties by these assumptions is to introduce tie-breaking rules. Under
various tie-breaking rules that come to mind, the analysis is messier, but does not result in any important
change in the conclusions.
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that is obtained purely from the act of voting for X versus Y based on the relative merits
of X and Y .
Now consider two scenarios. In the first, a = 0 and the voter is purely strategic. The
interpretation of α is then that it represents the voter’s subjective probability of being
pivotal. In particular, setting a = 0 and
α = Pr (X wins | vote X)−Pr (X wins | vote Y ) = Pr (Y wins | vote Y )−Pr (Y wins | vote X) ,
then the comparison in 2 reduces to (1). It is important to realize that this subjective
view is not necessarily objectively correct (although may still accurately describe voters’
views), since pivot probabilities are endogenous in this game, and in general votes can
be purchased in such a way that pivot probabilities are zero (for instance by buying one
extra vote).4
Alternatively, suppose that the voter anticipates a negligible pivot probability, but
has a > 0. Then, one can interpret α as a, and so α(Ui + cXi − cYi ) measures the utility
a voter obtains from casting a vote for the party that is preferred (according to initial
positions and campaign promises), even though that vote might not aﬀect the outcome.
Here α is not a pivot probability, but some explicit influence of outcome utilities into the
act of voting.5 For instance, in elections where votes are public, as in some legislative
votes or committee votes, a voter (legislator) might care significantly about how the vote
is cast regardless of outcome, and then α would be quite large.6
In large elections where votes are cast secretly α might be quite small. We still take it
to be a positive parameter, so that preferences over final outcomes serve as a tie-breaker.
2.3 Equilibrium
Strategies are defined in the obvious way, and the solution concept we use is subgame
perfect equilibrium. There are several facts about these equilibria that we can easily
deduce. Note that since the sum of payments guaranteed to all voters must go up by at
least ε in any two rounds such that the game is not declared to have ended, the bidding
process must end after a bounded number of rounds. This is thus a finite game with
4See Dal-Bo (2003) for an analysis of parties’ incentives to reduce pivot probabilities to 0.
5More generally, one could replace α(Ui + cXi − cYi ) by Vi that represents the utility for voting for i,
which might even be independent of the preferences for the outcome that results when i wins.
6Specifically, α would be the weight assigned to constituents preferences (for whatever reason) and c
would represent a lobbyist’s promises for contributions that oﬀset (or enhance) the constituents’ initial
preferences.
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perfect information, and so a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium can be found
by backward induction. Thus, equilibrium exists in pure strategies. Moreover, as ties
never occur, the equilibrium outcome must be the same for all equilibria in any subgame
(again by backward induction). This means that there are well identifiable winners and
losers.
Proposition 1 The vote-buying game has an equilibrium in pure strategies. In every
equilibrium the same party wins, and the losing party never makes any payment (but may
make contingent promises that do not result in payments).
The proofs of all propositions appear in the appendix.
Another important observation is that an up-front payment promise does at least as
well as a campaign promise because it is not impacted by α and also can be re-allocated
if the other party outbids it, and the winner (which both parties can deduce under
Proposition 1) is liable for the payments in either case.
Proposition 2 The winner in any equilibrium of the vote-buying game when both up-
front payments and campaign promises are permitted, is the same as the winner in any
equilibrium of a modified version of the game where only up-front payments are allowed.
It is important to note that although contingent payments are dominated by up-front
payments, the presence of campaign promises can aﬀect the total payments that the
winner needs to make in equilibrium. This can be seen in the following example.
Example 1 Campaign Promises make a Diﬀerence in the Payments.
Consider a three voter society where ε = 1, Ui = 1/2 for each i, and BX = 90, while
BY = 30. Let α = 1. It is easy to see that X wins in each equilibrium. There is an
equilibrium where Y sets cYi = 10 for all i, and then X has to oﬀer p
X
i = 10 to two voters
in order to win.
If we rule out campaign promises and only allow up-front payments, then X would
still win in all equilibria, but would never pay anything. That follows, since in order to
get X to pay something in equilibrium, Y would need to make some promises of up-front
payments. Once Y has bid, X’s final purchase will involve the two cheapest voters and
Y will end up buying at least one voter even though she does not win. This cannot be
part of an equilibrium as Y could deviate and never make any payments and be better
oﬀ. ¥
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3 Campaign Promises
We begin by studying the case where only campaign promises are permitted, and up-front
vote buying is outlawed. This serves as an important benchmark, as it is the case that
applies to many election settings. Also, as we have seen from Proposition 2, it is the only
case where campaign promises might have a significant impact on determining who wins
the election (rather than just how much is paid).
The parameter α is now irrelevant and voter i will vote forX if cXi +Ui > c
Y
i . Without
loss of generality, suppose that the median voter is a supporter of party X (Um > 0).
Let n = |{i : Ui > 0}| be the number of a priori supporters of X, that is the number
of voters who in the absence of any payments would prefer the outcome of X. The
analogous number for Y is simply N − n. Given a number z, let zε be the smallest
multiple of ε greater than z.
Let
T =
nX
i=m
Uεi > 0,
as in the shaded part of Figure 1 (drawn assuming U εi = Ui).
 m n  
Figure 1:
T is the minimal sum that Y has to promise to voters in order to secure the support
of a minimal majority, in a case where X does not promise anything. Thus T is one
measure of the preference advantage that X enjoys over Y .
Proposition 3 If BY ≥ BX+T then Y wins in any equilibrium; and X wins otherwise.
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This can be deduced from the proof of Proposition 4 below.
The idea behind Proposition 3 is fairly straightforward. Party Y must spend at least
T in order to secure a majority. After that, X will try to obtain some of these votes back
(or others, if Y has overspent on these marginal votes), and the competition back and
forth will lead to the winner being the party with the largest budget once an expense of
T has been incurred by Y .
Obviously, under complete information about the budgets, there are many equilibria
in the game with competition in campaign promises. Since the loser will not have to
fulfill its promises, it is indiﬀerent among all of its feasible platforms and this gives rise
to a large set of equilibria. However, in most of these equilibria the loser’s behavior
is silly: it is optimal only because the loser is certain it will lose. Thus, if there is
any, even slight, uncertainty about the relative strength of the parties, we expect that
the range of equilibrium behaviors will narrow down dramatically. Indeed, Proposition
4 below establishes that the only equilibria that survive uncertainty over the relative
size of the budgets involve “Least Expensive Majority” (LEM) strategies, in which the
parties purchase the least expensive majority in their turn. The uncertainty over budgets
introduced rules out “implausible” equilibria, and can be thought as small.
Proposition 4 If BX and BY are distributed with full support over {0, ε, ..., Bε}, then
in any equilibrium:
(i) Both parties play LEM strategies.
(ii) Y wins if BY ≥ BX+T and ends up pledging exactly BX+T , and X wins otherwise
and ends up pledging exactly max{BY − T + ε, 0}.
Let nˆ = {min i : Ui > −ε}. If both parties use LEM strategies, then only voters
between m and nˆ ever receive positive payments, and the total payments received are
max
©
0, BY − T + ε
ª
if X wins and BX + T if Y wins. That is, the winner commits ε
more than the loser who commits its entire budget to a subset of these “near median”
voters. If BY < T then any strategy by Y is an LEM strategy, and no payments are
made (although Y might still make promises).
While payments are concentrated among the voters between m and nˆ, the particulars
of which voters get how much can diﬀer across equilibria. For example, in one equilibrium
using LEM strategies in a case where BY > BX + T , the final outcome is that Party X
ends up oﬀering its entire budget BX to a single voter, say voter m, and Party Y ends up
winning by oﬀering Uεi +B
X to that voter and U εi to all voters i ∈ [m,n]. This happens
10
by having the parties repeatedly outbid each other by a minimal amount for voter m.
In another equilibrium with LEM strategies, X’s budget is spread equally over voters
i ∈ [m,n], and Y matches all those bids and tops them oﬀ by Uεi to compensate for these
voters’ initial preference for X.
4 Up-Front Vote Buying with Negligible Voting Pref-
erences
We now consider the situation where up-front vote buying is permitted, and we can then
contrast that with the outcome where only campaign promises are allowed, to see the
impact of up-front vote buying.
We first consider the case where voting preferences are negligible, that is, where α is
small enough so that |αUi| < ε. This is a transparent case to analyze since voters view
their vote as having no consequence on its own, and thus are happy to tender to the
bidder with the highest oﬀer. As a result, the party with the highest budget (up to a
factor of ε) wins at a negligible cost.
Proposition 5 In the small α case, party X wins in (every) equilibrium if and only if
BX ≥ BY +(m− n) ε. In any equilibrium where X wins, its total payments are bounded
above by mαB
Y
m−1 +mε.
The proof appears in the appendix, where we show that if BX ≥ BY +(m− n) ε then
the LEM strategy guarantees a victory to X against any bidding strategy that Y might
adopt. This implies that, in equilibrium, Y will not enter the bidding except for some
bids that will end up surely being outbid or campaign promises that will never be paid.
Note that since budgets appear in multiples of ε, the proposition provides a complete
characterization of the winner, as then BX < BY + (m− n) ε if and only if BY ≥
BX + (m− (N − n)) ε.7
We see that introducing up-front vote buying when α is negligible results in a winner
determined purely by the relative size of the budgets. This contrasts with the case where
only campaign promises are permitted, where the utility advantage of one candidate over
7If there is uncertainty about exactly how many voters prefer each candidate (n is random), then a
candidate whose budget is larger than the other candidate’s by Nε wins. The exact diﬀerence required
and the exact payments will depend on specifics of the distribution and are not of suﬃcient interest to
explore in detail.
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another, T , enters significantly into the calculations of the winner. Moreover, the voters
get lower payments under up-front vote buying than under competition in campaign
promises. The contingent nature of campaign promises allows the loser to make significant
promises that need to be matched by the winner. In contrast, in up-front vote-buying
competition with negligible α the party destined to lose would just lose money if it made
significant up-front bids. As with campaign promises alone, the loser may still make
significant campaign promises, but when α is small the winner can compete against those
with negligible up-front payments.
We also note that the conclusions of Proposition 5 is in contrast with the results of
Groseclose and Snyder (1996) who analyzed a game where each party gets to move only
once, and in sequence. That provides a significant second-mover advantage to one of
the parties, which contrasts sharply with the open-ended sequential nature of our game.
The small α case here corresponds to a case with small utilities in Groseclose and Snyder
(1996). In their analysis, with utilities, the first moving party would need a budget at
least twice that of the second mover in order to win. Essentially, the first mover needs to
be able to bid in such a way that the second mover cannot aﬀord to buy any majority.
In a game without an exogenously determined last mover, as the one we analyze, if one
party is (temporarily) outbid for some voter, it can remobilize those resources. This back
and forth places parties on a more equal footing.
5 Up-front Vote Buying with Significant Voting Pref-
erences.
We now study the case where α is significant. Here, as we have already analyzed the
case where only campaign promises are possible, appealing to Proposition 2, we focus on
the case where only up-front payments are possible, as our main concern is which party
wins the election. The case of up-front payments alone is also interesting as a model of
environments where campaign promises are not credible. As mentioned earlier, the case
of large αUi’s is relevant for a model of voting in a legislature in the presence of lobbying
or where voters have nontrivial preferences over how they vote–regardless of their not
being pivotal.
Besides the substantive interest in this case, it is also somewhat interesting from an
analytical point of view. When the voting preferences carry more significant weight, the
identification of the winner entails more complicated considerations that involve both
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the budgets and the preferences. Despite the simplicity of our model, the problem of
identifying the winner in terms of the budgets and preferences turns out to be hard.
Nevertheless, we can provide characterizations of the winners of this competition, in the
case where the budgets are suﬃciently large (as specified below).
The main result we have this case is that when budgets are large enough the winner is
determined by comparing Y ’s advantage in the budgets (BY −BX) with (approximately)
one half utility advantage of X over Y (ΣiαUi). In order to understand why the utilities
of all voters matter, but only count half as much as the size of the budgets, it is useful
to understand the structure of the winning strategies. The following example contrasts
the optimal strategy for the winner, with what up to this point has seemed to be a good
strategy, namely the LEM (least expensive majority) strategy.
Example 2 Optimal versus Naive Strategies - Why Utility has a Shadow Price of 1/2.
There are three voters with αU1 = αU2 = 0.5 and αU3 = −30.5. The grid of bids is
in units. Budgets are BX = 100 and BY = 80.
Note that BX −BY = 20, so the utility advantage for Y is greater than the absolute
budget advantage of X. Nevertheless, as we show below in Corollary 1, X should win,
because X’s budget exceeds Y ’s budget plus half of the utility diﬀerence. That is, basi-
cally what matters is the budget advantage relative to one half the preference advantage
(setting aside small corrections that are explained in the proof of the result). Let us see
how X should play to win.
Suppose that X follows the naive LEM strategy of always spending the least amount
necessary to guarantee a majority at any stage. Suppose (just for the purpose of illus-
tration) that at the first stage Y makes oﬀers of 55 to voter 1 and 25 to voter 3. The
cheapest voter for X to buy back is voter 1 at a cost of 55. Assume Y now oﬀers 55
to voter 2. At this point X has 45 in budget left, and cannot aﬀord to buy back either
voter 2 or 3.
What was wrong with this strategy? The problem is that whileX bought the cheapest
voter in response to Y ’s oﬀer, X also freed up a large amount of Y ’s budget for Y to
spend elsewhere, while X’s budget was committed. X needs to worry not only about
what X is spending at any given stage, but also about how much of Y ’s budget is freed
up. Eﬀectively, freeing up a unit of Y ’s budget is “just” as bad for X as spending an
extra unit of X’s budget.
So, instead of following the naive LEM strategy of buying the cheapest voters, let X
always follow a strategy of measuring the “shadow price” of a voter as the amount that
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X must spend plus the amount of Y ’s budget that is freed up. If X had followed that
strategy, then in response to Y ’s first stage oﬀer above, X would have purchased voter 3
at a price of 56. Then Y would have 25 free, and could only spend it on voters 1 and 2.
Regardless of how Y spends this budget, X can always buy voter 2 at the next stage at
a price of at most 25, to which Y has no winning response. ¥
The example shows that, indeed, keeping track of the shadow price is a good strategy.
In fact, for large budgets it is an optimal strategy in that it guarantees a win for whichever
candidate should win according to Proposition 6 below. Let us see how we get from this
understanding of “shadow prices” to the expressions underlying Proposition 6.
Under the strategy suggested in the above example, X keeps track of the oﬀer that X
has to make to buy a voter given the current oﬀer of Y , plus the amount of Y ’s budget
that is freed up. The amount that X has to oﬀer to buy a given voter i when Y has an
oﬀer of pYi in place is p
Y
i −αUi. The amount of Y ’s budget that is freed up is pYi . So the
“shadow price” of buying voter i is 2pYi − αUi. Dividing through by 2 gives us pYi − αUi2 .
This translates into “strength” of Y being Y ’s budget less the αUi
2
’s of the majority of
voters that are most favorable to Y . Similarly X’s “ strength” is X’s budget plus the
αUi
2
’s of the majority of voters that are most favorable to X.
This is captured in the following proposition, which includes some slight adjustments
to account for the grid size and some other details that are covered in the formal proof
of the following results in the appendix.
Proposition 6 Party X wins if
BX −BY ≥ −
X
i
αUi/2− αUN/2 +mε and (3)
BX ≥
¯¯¯¯
mαU1
2
¯¯¯¯
−
PN
i=m+1 αUi
2
− αUN
2
+mε (4)
and party Y wins if
BX −BY ≤ −
X
i
αUi/2− αU1/2−mε and (5)
BY ≥
¯¯¯¯
mαUN
2
¯¯¯¯
+
Pm−1
i=1 αUi
2
+
αU1
2
+mε. (6)
If the budgets are large enough so that (4) and (6) are satisfied, then we have the
following corollary.
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Corollary 1 If the budgets are large enough so that (4) and (6) are satisfied, then X
wins if
BX ≥ BY −
X
i
αUi/2− αUN/2 +mε
and Y wins if
BY ≥ BX +
X
i
αUi/2 + αU1/2 +mε.
The interesting feature is that, very roughly, increasing a voter’s preference for a given
party by $1 is equivalent, in terms of who wins, to increasing the budget of that party by
$0.5. Thus money is worth much more to a party than being liked, as might be expected
due to the use of funds being more flexible.
Note that the small α case of Proposition 5 is a special case of the above results. With
small α,
P
i αUi is negligible relative to the budgets, and the comparison boils down to
a comparison of the budgets. Note also, that then the optimal strategy simplifies to the
LEM strategy, but the LEM is only optimal in that special case.
The next example shows that Proposition 6 is not valid without the assumption of
large enough budgets.
Example 3 Large versus Small Budgets
Consider a society where BY = 0. Let there be 3 voters. Let αU1 = −10, αU2 = −20,
and αU3 = −30. Let BX = 30.2 and have the grid be in ε = 0.1. Here X can win by
buying voters 1 and 2 at prices of 10.1 and 20.1.
In this example
BX +
P
i αUi
2
+
αU1
2
= −5 < BY −mε = −.2,
and so if we applied the expressions from Proposition 6, we would mistakenly conclude
that Y should win. Those expressions cannot be applied when the budgets are small. ¥
We close this section with an example showing that while voters preferences only
count half as much as monetary budgets, having minority support that is very strong
can be enough to help a candidate overcome having a smaller budget than the opposition.
Example 4 The party with a smaller budget and minority support can win
There are three voters and let ε = .1.
U1 = U2 = 10 while U3 = −60, and α = 1.
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The budgets are BX = 200 and BY = 190. So X has a larger budget and starts with
the support of the majority of voters. However, applying Proposition 6, we see that
BX +
P
i αUi
2
+
αU1
2
= 185 < BY −mε = 190− .2.
Here, the strong support of the third voter for Y is a big asset. Very roughly, the game
boils down to one where X has to win the support both voters 1 and 2, while Y needs
only to get one of them. ¥
6 Unknown preferences
Our analysis so far has focused on situations where the voting preferences are known. In
many cases, this is a reasonable first approximation, as voters’ preferences might be highly
correlated with observable characteristics (and in such cases where parties are lobbies and
voters are legislators with voting records and known constituencies). However, there are
some cases where there may be significant uncertainty about voters’ preferences and
so it is worth understanding how our results are aﬀected by the introduction of such
uncertainty. In the case where α is small (with up-front vote buying), the introduction
of uncertainty about voter’s preferences will not have a significant impact, as the larger
budget will still win. However, if either α is large, or up-front vote buying is ruled out
and only campaign promises are possible, then uncertainty can matter.
We examine the case of up-front vote buying, as with the uncertainty introduced here,
voters are essentially symmetric from the parties’ viewpoint, and so now the analysis of
the case where only campaign promises are permitted is similar to that of up-front vote
buying.
Suppose that, for all i, αUi is an independent draw from a continuous distribution
F . We assume that F has a connected support and a continuous and positive density
on its support, such that z + F (z)/f(z) and z + (F (z)− 1)/f(z) are both increasing on
the support of F . There are many prominent distributions satisfying this, such as the
uniform distribution. Let αU¯ = F−1(0.5) be the median of the distribution F . In this
environment we impose the constraint that parties’ oﬀers must in expectation be within
their budgets at each point in the game, assuming it ends at that point.
Proposition 7 For any δ > 0, there is N(δ) and ε¯ such that for all N > N(δ) and all
grids with ε ∈ (0, ε¯) the following hold.
• If BY > BX + αU¯N/2 + δ, then Y wins with probability of at least 1− δ.
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• If BX > BY − αU¯N/2 + δ, then X wins with probability of at least 1− δ.
The result is almost a complete characterization for large N , as the budgets cover
most possible budget diﬀerences except than those that fall in an interval of size 2δ.
We note that when δ is suﬃciently small, the party who is likely to lose will not enter
the bidding and the winning party will bid the minimum necessary to secure majority
with suﬃciently high probability. Thus, we again can see a result that echoes the earlier
ones, with minimal spending in equilibrium.
As mentioned above, Proposition 7 extends readily to the analysis of campaign
promises, where the main change is that α drops out and F is the distribution of Ui
rather than the αUi’s.
7 Discussion
7.1 The Budgets
In the analysis above budgets were treated exogenously, but the interpretation of some
results, and the analysis of eﬃciency below, depend on the source of the budgets. There
are two main sources for payments to voters: party budgets (donations by interested
parties and government funding of parties) and general government resources if the party
wins (which may diﬀer across parties due to diﬀerent abilities to generate or use these
resources). While government resources might seem relevant only for contingent pay-
ments, one could also imagine parties taking loans that would be repaid using government
resources. (In fact, one might think of some donations as implicitly being of this form,
often repaid with a very high interest rate.)
When we discussed allowing both up-front payments and campaign promises we ar-
gued that campaign promises are dominated by up-front payments (see Proposition 1
and Lemma 2). Our assumption there that both these payments come from the same
budget is consistent with either source of funds (donations or appropriating government
resources). That payments come from donations is consistent with the interpretation
that campaign promises are a contractual form of payment from the party that is made
contingent on the party winning and not on a voter’s vote. (In section 7.2 below we dis-
cuss, but do not fully analyze, another form of contingent contract, namely purchasing
the vote with a payment that is contingent on winning. In such contracts payment is
eﬀectively conditional on both the individual’s vote and the election outcome.) That
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payments are also made from government resources conditional on winning, fits the inter-
pretation that campaign promises correspond to platforms (as in Myerson (1993)), i.e.,
as promises to a particular set of distributive payments conditional on being elected, and
up-front payments are funded by loans that are repaid if the party wins. Of course, in
an expanded model with endogenous loans the lenders will only lend to a party that they
expect will win; we do not explicitly analyze this extended game.
7.1.1 Eﬃciency and Endogenous Budgets
In the absence of any mechanism for trading votes, the outcome of voting will in general
be ineﬃcient. There is simply nothing to make voters take into account the eﬀect of
their vote on others. A natural hypothesis then is that the opening of trade will bring
about eﬃcient outcomes. Our analysis shows that this is not so in all the cases we
considered. Even if we take the budgets of the parties to represent the utility of some
unmodeled agents, the outcome of a vote-buying equilibrium is in general ineﬃcient. In
the small α case of the direct purchase scenario, essentially only the budgets matter:
If voters strongly support X, but Y has a slightly larger budget, Y still wins. In the
large α case, even if we consider the α = 1 case in which the underlying preferences
enter voting decisions fully, the aﬀect of voters’ preferences is only about half that of
the budgets. Finally, in the campaign-promises scenario only the preferences of voters
near the median group aﬀect the outcome, which hence does not reflect the preferences
of all the rest. Since vote selling decisions in the direct-purchase case are aﬀected only
by voting preferences (the αUi’s), rather than by the fundamental preferences (the Ui’s),
obviously the outcome does not fully reflect the latter. However, this is not the only
source of ineﬃciency. Under competition in campaign promises the voting decisions do
take into account the fundamental preferences, but are nonetheless typically ineﬃcient;
with up-front purchases the outcomes are ineﬃcient even with respect to the voting
preferences.
Under what circumstances will vote trading result in eﬃciency? First, in the models
that we have considered above, the equilibrium will be eﬃcient if for some reason the
budgets are proportional to the true surpluses. That is, let UX beX’s support in terms of
total utility of voters (UX =
P
i[Ui]
+), and UY be Y ’s support in terms of total utility of
voters (UY =
P
i[−Ui]+), then the equilibria will be eﬃcient if BX/UX = BY /UY . This
would be the case, for example, if the budgets are raised through individual donations
that are somehow proportional to values. More fundamentally, trading is capable of
achieving eﬃciency, if every voter is made pivotal with respect to the decision. For
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example, if the voting mechanism requires unanimity (say, X is the status quo outcome
that would be replaced by Y only upon unanimous approval), then when vote trading
is allowed this is in fact an N-person bargaining problem with complete information for
which a wide variety of trading procedures will result in eﬃciency. But unanimity is
not necessary. Even if the simple majority requirement is maintained, one can construct
vote trading games that put a suﬃcient subset of the voters in a pivotal position so as
to yield the eﬃcient outcome. The vote-trading game outlined below does just that. It
illustrates how eﬃciency can be (almost always) attained by making voters pivotal.8 In
this game the parties’ budgets are raised via a simple donation game that precedes the
up-front vote-buying game analyzed above. While as before the voters are not pivotal
in the voting stage, the sequential donation stage makes a suﬃcient subset of the voters
pivotal to guarantee eﬃciency.
The Campaign-Donation Vote-Buying Game is as follows.
(1) There is some ordering over voters, according to which voters sequentially choose an
amount to donate to each party, where voter i’s donations are denoted (dXi , d
Y
i ) ∈
[0, |Ui|]. Donations are made in a series of rounds, and voters can increase their
promised donations in any round. Any increase must be at least in multiples of ε,
or the remaining budget that a voter has if that is smaller than ε. The donation
part of the game ends when there is a round with no increases in donations.9
(2) The parties’ budgets are BX =
P
i d
X
i and B
Y =
P
i d
Y
i .
(3) The parties play the vote-buying game.
We first consider the small α case.
Proposition 8 Party X wins in the campaign-donations vote-buying game if and only
if UX ≥ UY + (m− n)ε.
8The “almost always” caveat is needed since our characterizations have some slack. For small α,
by Proposition 5, it is only up to a factor of mε that the winner is the party with the larger budget.
Similarly for general α, by Proposition 6, a party that provides greater total utility and has a greater
budget wins, but only up to a factor of max {αU1, αUN}+mε, and if the budgets are large enough. For
large populations this factor is small compared to total utility.
9As noted, we cap voters’ donations at their total utility and require minimal increases. One could
alternatively consider the infinite game where voters could make arbitrary increases in donations in any
given period (and would have to assign a largely negative utility to the infinite path where the game
never ends). In equilibrium, voters would never make payments exceeding their total utility in any case,
and although they might make higher payments oﬀ the equilibrium path. We have not explored whether
this alternative leads to diﬀerent outcomes.
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We omit the proof as it is fairly straightforward. An analogous result is available for
the large α case (and is stated at the end of the appendix).
To understand the sense in which the donation game makes voters pivotal, consider
a subgame in which Y ’s supporters have already donated UY and X’s supporters have
so far donated D < UY + (m − n)ε. Suppose that voter j is last in the sequence of X
supporters and is such that Uj > 0 has not donated yet and that D+Uj > UY +(m−n)ε.
Then this subgame has an equilibrium in which voter j donates at least an ε to X, which
is the minimum required to keep the game moving. Thus, at this point j is made pivotal:
if she does not donate the game will end withX’s loss; if she donates only part of the sum,
everybody will still expect her to complete her donation in the following round. Clearly,
In this manner the donation game guarantees eﬃciency by designating a suﬃcient subset
of voters as pivotal in any subgame. Thus, if UX > UY + (m − n)ε, there might be
some slack and the equilibrium may place only some subset of X’s supporters in pivotal
positions, but if UX = UY + (m−n)ε, every X’s supporter will be made pivotal at least
in some subgame (possibly oﬀ path).
Going back to the vote buying models we have analyzed, the main source of the
ineﬃciency is now clear. In those models the voters are not pivotal. Notice, however,
that this is not due to some peculiarity of those models. These models describe rather
natural processes of vote trading; and other natural models (e.g., uniform restricted price
oﬀers10) would yield similar results with respect to eﬃciency. As we have just seen, it
is possible to design vote trading games, like the above campaign-donation-vote-buying
game, that make everybody pivotal. But the artificial features of that game (such as the
sequential donation process played by the voters) which are necessary to make everybody
pivotal, just highlight the fact that natural processes of free bidding will not put every
voter in a pivotal position and hence are inherently ineﬃcient.
Does vote trading entail greater welfare loss than would occur in its absence? Based
on our results, we can see that it is easy to construct examples that go either way: trading
in either form may generate higher or lower overall utility than straight voting. What
we learn from all of our models is that budgets count for more than utilities. Thus, if we
think of the budgets as being raised from donations of the voters and recognize that free
riding would limit the donations of small anonymous individuals, the opening of trade
is likely to give an advantage to groups of voters who are more capable of translating
preferences to budgets. These might be small numbers of wealthy individuals who care
intensely about the outcome or other groups organized in small cells with strong ties (say,
10See the discussion of Harris-Raviv’s work in 7.3.3 below.
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religious groups) who manage to overcome free riding. (A donation game of the rough
nature outlined above might be a reasonable model for a small non-anonymous groups).
The opening of vote trading will elevate the relative importance of such groups, but of
course nothing can be said in general on whether these biases are likely to produce lower
total utility than simple voting.
7.2 Contingent Payments
Another natural form of strategy that the parties might use is one where an up-front
promise is made and a vote purchased, but where the payment oﬀered is contingent on
winning. This is a sort of hybrid of campaign promises and up-front oﬀers: the vote
is explicitly purchased and controlled as in the case of an up-front payment, but the
payment is contingent on winning as is a campaign promise. It is more complicated
in terms of how voters value such contingent promises, as the value of the promise is
endogenous to the equilibrium outcome.
Nevertheless, the consideration of such contingent payments in addition to up-front
purchases has little impact on the outcome of the vote buying games studied above in
the following sense. The winner has no benefit of using such purchases (and may have
a cost if the voters value them less, e.g., by the factor α). For the loser, they do not
cost anything, but still the promises made cannot exceed the budget. The consequence
is that the equilibrium winner of the game where contingent payments are also allowed
turns out to be the same as when they are not considered. The only modification is
that the payments in equilibrium may change, as the loser might make some contingent
promises that end up being costless for her, but the winner ends up having to outbid
these promises in equilibrium.
Thus, all of the propositions extend to the additional consideration of contingent pay-
ments, modulo the fact that the payments by the winner might be larger in Proposition
5. (Note that Propositions 3 and 4 only consider campaign promises, and so no up-front
promises would be considered, contingent or otherwise.) The idea of the proof is the
following: suppose that the winner changed from X to Y due to the introduction of such
contingent promises. Then in equilibrium, any of Y ’s promises turn out not to be contin-
gent. By using non-contingent promises according to the original equilibrium strategy X
can defeat Y ’s strategy. While this stops short of being a proof, it provides the essential
ideas. Nevertheless, we do think it would be of interest to study such contingent vote
buying on its own. As mentioned the main diﬃculty then is how to appropriately model
voter behavior.
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7.3 Related literature
As mentioned in the introduction, there are three literatures that have had something
to say about vote buying. Having our results as a backdrop, it is easy to discuss and
contrast the results from those literatures with what we have shown here. This should
help to put our contribution in perspective.
7.3.1 Colonel Blotto Games
A “Colonel Blotto Game” is one where two opposing armies simultaneously allocate
forces among n fronts. Any given front is won by the army that committed a larger
force to that front and the overall winner is the army that wins a majority of the fronts.
This model can be readily interpreted as a model of electoral competition, where each
party wins the voters to whom it made the larger promise and the overall winner of the
election is the party that managed to win a majority of the votes. Indeed formal models
of electoral competition with promises using this framework date back at least to Gross
and Wagner’s (1950) continuous version of a Colonel Blotto game.
One diﬃculty in using the Colonel Blotto Game to deduce anything about vote buying
is that, even in the simplest setting with identical voters and candidates, such games are
notoriously diﬃcult to solve.11 The existing analyses are of symmetric mixed strategy
equilibria in which voters are treated identically (from an ex ante point of view) and the
parties are equally likely to win.
In an important contribution Myerson (1993) circumvents some of the technical diﬃ-
culties of Colonel Blotto games by allowing candidates to meet the budget constraint on
average, rather than exactly, which renders the game much more tractable.12 In particu-
lar, Myerson considers a simultaneous move game that is similar to the platform game we
analyze (where parties promise payments conditional on winning and not on individual
voting behavior), but where parties’ can oﬀer random payments to each voter and the
payments need only meet the budget in expectation. As in the previous Colonel Blotto
11See Laslier and Picard (2002) and Szentes and Rosenthal (2003) for some characterizations of equi-
libria.
12See also Lizzeri (1999) who allows for asymmetries in the budgets to study why parties may create
budget deficits, and Lizzeri and Persico (2001), who study games where candidates can choose whether
or not to oﬀer a public good in addition to a redistribution.
Our platform game and that of Myerson are also related to an earlier literature where parties compete
in oﬀering (simultaneously) redistributive platforms, where negative payments (taxation) is allowed.
This literature includes, for example, Cox and McCubbins (1986), Dixit and Londregan (1996) and
Lindbeck and Weibull (1987).
22
literature, Myerson assumes voters and parties are symmetric, and derives a symmetric
mixed strategy equilibrium in which parties exhaust their budgets. Our work diﬀers
from this in two (significant) ways. First, the sequential version of our game enables us
to consider asymmetric voters and parties. This allows us to see how preferences and
budgets matter in determining who wins in the vote buying game. If we just look at
our campaign-promise game for the basis of comparison, then we can see how payments
are distributed across voters as a function of their preferences. When voter preferences
are known, then parties concentrate their competition completely on near-median voters.
When voter preferences are unknown, payments are uniform across voters.13 Second, we
allow for two types of promises. It turns out that the up-front vote buying game has
substantially diﬀerent outcomes and intuitions than the campaign-promises game.
7.3.2 Vote Buying Games in Political Science
Groseclose and Snyder (1996) present a model of vote buying in a legislature. Their model
is similar to the up-front vote buying version of our analysis, except for the distinction
that their model ends after two rounds. This drastically alters the strategic quality of the
game as in their analysis the second mover has a substantial advantage. The first mover
has to purchase a supermajority of voters in order to successfully block the response of
the second mover. Thus, for example, if all voters were indiﬀerent between candidates,
the first mover would need twice the budget of the second mover in order to win, since
the second mover should not be able to purchase the least expensive 50%. As is evident
from the above analysis, our more symmetric bidding process neutralizes the aﬀect of the
order of moves and consequently gets significantly diﬀerent results both with respect to
the identity of the winner, and how much they pay and which voters they buy.
There are other articles that are related in that they address the same considerations
that motivate us. But those discussions are so distant in terms of their focus and frame-
work that they should be considered largely complementary to our discussion it does not
seem useful to try to relate them to our analysis. For example, Kochin and Kochin (1998)
oﬀer a logic for the prohibition of vote buying, which is based on the costs of buying votes
and forming blocking coalitions. This, they argue, can lead to ineﬃcient decisions de-
pending on the source of costs and how they are distributed. They suggest that in the
absence of any costs, vote buying will always lead to eﬃcient decisions, although the
13In our case, this is ex post as well as ex ante: preference uncertainty substitutes for the random
payments in Myerson’s game.
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specific vote buying process is not modeled.14 Philipson and Snyder (1996) find Pareto
improvements from vote buying. They model a specialist system for vote buying, and a
one dimensional policy space, and find that, if the distribution of ideal points is skewed
enough, then the equilibrium with vote buying diﬀers from the equilibrium without vote
buying (the median ideal point). This diﬀerence reflects the ability of an intense minority
to obtain a policy it prefers in exchange for side payments.
7.3.3 Corporate control
The literature on corporate control (Harris and Raviv(1988), Grossman and Hart (1988))
is also related to our analysis. They examine settings in which two alternative manage-
ment teams–an incumbent and a rival–are competing to gain control of a corporation
through acquisition of a majority of the shareholders’ votes. The alternative teams are
the counterparts of our parties and the private benefits that these teams would extract
from controlling the corporation are the counterparts of the parties’ valuations for being
elected. The model of Harris and Raviv15 (henceforth HR) has one round of bidding
by each team (like that of Groseclose and Snyder), but with an additional diﬀerence
that oﬀers are not made to specific voters16–but to the public at large–with a cap on
the number of shares that will be purchased, and then rationing if too many shares are
tendered to one of the teams. Harris and Raviv characterize an equilibrium where the
eﬃcient team wins; that is, the team that maximizes the total shareholder value plus the
private benefit of being the management team. However, that equilibrium relies critically
on every voter believing that their tendering decision will be completely pivotal, and as
such it is very fragile in the sense that any uncertainty about the number of shares,
actions of other voters, or oﬀers, etc., would destabilize the equilibrium.17
We believe the Harris and Raviv game has other equilibria which are stable and can
14This idea is also implicit in arguments by Tobin (1970), who suggests that a market for votes would
allow power to be concentrated among the rich - suggesting some frictions in borrowing.
15The related model of Grossman and Hart does not seem to have an explicit equilibrium model for
the case that would be close to our model (what they call competition in restricted oﬀers between parties
with significant private benefits).
16In the corporate control model, all voters have identical preferences based on the diﬀerence in share
value that will be generated under the two teams.
17Their model has a continuum of voters and so is not quite a closed game theoretic model. It appears
that a large finite approximation to this equilibrium could be built, but the equilibrium would be unstable
in that any shift in bidders’ beliefs would lead to a change in their tendering strategies - and a movement
to another equilibrium in the subgame (the one conjectured below).
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be described as follows.18 Voters do not believe they will be pivotal and tender so as
to equate their expected revenue (price times probably of not being rationed) across the
parties. In this equilibrium the party oﬀering the higher price wins (with prices on a
grid). Going backwards, this implies that in the overall equilibrium the party with the
higher budget wins (with a payment that depends on whether it moves first or second,
as in the analysis of Groseclose and Snyder (1996)).
As mentioned above, the instability of the eﬃcient equilibrium that Harris and Raviv
analyze seems to make it less plausible than our conjectured alternative, ineﬃcient, equi-
libria. One question that comes to mind is why those equilibria diﬀer from the Groseclose
and Snyder (1996) equilibria which have a strong second mover advantage? The answer
is that the Harris and Raviv model does not have targeted oﬀers, but instead oﬀers made
to voters at large, with the possibility of some rationing. The absence of targeting ef-
fectively eliminates the second mover (there are still some advantages of being second
mover in the amount paid in equilibrium, but not in who wins). Thus, these conjectured
equilibria would be closer to our model where there are repeated rounds and the largest
budget has an advantage. Of course, given that the Harris and Raviv model does not
have targeted oﬀers, it would not permit an analysis of vote buying in the presence of
heterogeneous voters as we have analyzed here.
This discussion should make it clear why the equilibria that we identify and the con-
clusions we reach diﬀer substantially from both Harris and Raviv (1988) and Groseclose
and Snyder (1996).
7.4 Minimal Payments
One fairly straightforward prediction of our model is that unless there is substantial
uncertainty about the budgets of the parties (or large voting preferences and both up-
front vote buying and campaign promises), there will tend to be minimal spending in
equilibrium. This is broadly consistent with some stylized facts that we see both in
political elections and stock shares. For instance, Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder
(2002) document the paucity of money being contributed to political campaigns and find
that the largest part of the relatively small donations to campaigns comes from individuals
and has little impact on legislator’s votes (a puzzle first pointed out by Tullock (1972)).
One could view the money contributed as attempts to “buy” votes. One also sees this
18These are equilibria that we conjecture, but are not mentioned by Harris and Raviv. We do not
provide a formal analysis, as it would take a good deal of space to set up the model, for a relatively
tangential point.
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in the price of stock shares, where the price of voting shares is generally similar to that
of non-voting shares (Lamont and Thaler (2001)). While our highly stylized analysis is
certainly not the only explanation for these observations, it does provide some intuition
for them.
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9 Appendix
Proposition 1: The vote-buying game has an equilibrium in pure strategies. In every
equilibrium the same party wins, and the losing party never makes any payment (but may
make contingent promises that do not result in payments).
Proof of Proposition 1: The facts that the vote-buying game has an equilibrium in
pure strategies follows from the fact that this is a finite game of perfect information, and
hence we can find such an equilibrium via backwards induction.
The fact that in every equilibrium the same party wins, also follows from a backward
induction argument. Each terminal node has a unique winner (as the αUi’s are not a
multiple of ε and so voters are never indiﬀerent), and parties prefer to win regardless of
the payments necessary. Thus, in any subgame, working by induction back from nodes
whose successors are only terminal nodes, there is a unique winner. It then follows
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directly that the losing party never makes any payments, as they could otherwise deviate
to oﬀer nothing and guarantee no payment.
Proposition 2: The winner in any equilibrium of the vote-buying game when both up-
front payments and campaign promises are permitted, is the same as the winner in any
equilibrium of a modified version of the game where only up-front payments are allowed.
Proof of Proposition 2: By Proposition 1, we know that there is a unique winner
in every equilibrium of the unmodified game. Without loss of generality, say that X is
the winner and Y is the loser, of the game where both forms of promises are permit-
ted. Consider a game where X is permitted to make both forms of promises and Y is
only permitted to make up-front payments. As this only imposes a restriction on Y ’s
strategies, X remains the winner of all equilibria of this game.19 Next we note that there
exists an equilibrium in this game where at any node X only makes up-front payment
promises (or no promises), as at any point an up-front payment is at least as attractive
to a voter as an equivalent campaign promise and is at least as flexible for X as it is no
more binding.20 This (properly trimmed) remains an equilibrium of the game (with the
trimmed tree) where no campaign promises are permitted.
Proposition 4: If BX and BY are distributed with full support over {0, ε, ..., Bε}, then
in any equilibrium:
1. Both parties play LEM strategies.
2. Y wins if BY ≥ BX + T and ends up pledging exactly BX + T , and X wins
otherwise and ends up pledging exactly max{BY − T + ε, 0}.
Proof of Proposition 4: The proof is based on three lemmas. First, we characterize the
outcomes resulting when at least one player follows LEM strategies. Second, we conclude
that there is an equilibrium in which both play LEM strategies. Third, we prove that in
any equilibrium LEM strategies are played by both.
19More formally, start with an equilibrium in the larger game. Trim the tree so that we eliminate any
actions of Y that result in campaign promises. By backward induction, in any subgame of the resulting
tree if X won previously, X still wins, while if Y won, then either Y still wins or else X wins. As X
won previously in the overall game, X still wins.
20To be careful, we need to keep track of Y ’s responses to X’s actions. However, given that Y can only
make up-front payments, using a backward induction argument we can establish that in any subgame
X’s chance of winning (which is either 0 or 1 in any subgame) can only go up by a switch from a
campaign promise to an equivalent up-front payment.
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Lemma 1 1. If BY ≥ BX + t, then
(a) If X uses an LEM strategy then with an LEM strategy Y wins and spends
BX + t.
(b) If X adopts an LEM strategy, then to win Y must spend at least BX + t.
(c) If Y uses the LEM strategy then X cannot win.
2. If BY < BX + t, then
(a) If Y uses an LEM strategy then with an LEM strategy X wins and spends
BY − t+ ε.
(b) If Y adopts the LEM strategy then to win X must spend at least BY − t+ ε.
(c) If X uses the LEM strategy then Y cannot win.
Proof of Lemma 1: 1a and 2a follow immediately from the nature of the LEM strate-
gies: Y initially must buy (we use the term buy to indicate voters who are convinced by
the platform to vote for the buying party) n−m+1 of the voters from m to n at cost t;
X then must buy one voter with an additional cost of ε (either one of those bought by
Y or possibly n + 1 if |Un+1| < ε); Y then must buy a voter back at additional cost ε;
and so on. Iﬀ BY ≥ BX + t will this process end with Y winning. ¤
1b is proved by induction on BX as follows. Clearly, 1b is true for BX = 0 and any t.
Suppose it is true for BX ≤ K and for all t, and consider BX = K+ε. Let T be the sum
spent by Y in its first step. Clearly, T ≥ t. Following its LEM strategy X pays some S
such that ε ≤ S ≤ T − t + ε. If X’s budget is such that it cannot purchase a majority
then any payment more than t by Y in the first step is redundant. Otherwise, after X’s
purchase, the situation is equivalent to an initial configuration with t0 = ε, BY 0 = BY −T
and BX0 = BX −S ≥ BX − (T − t+ ε). Since BX0 ≤ K, by the inductive assumption Y
must spend from this point on at least BX0+ ε and hence Y ’s overall expenditure will be
BX0 + ε+ T . Now, this and BX0 ≥ BX − (T − t+ ε) imply that Y ’s overall expenditure
is at least BX − (T − t+ ε) + ε + T = BX + t. So Y cannot benefit from spending
more than t, and as noted above can lose. (Note that Y spending t initially is an LEM
strategy for Y .) ¤
For all x, Part 2x is the counterpart of 1x. In particular, 2b is analogous to 1b.
Finally, 1c follows from 2b. This completes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 2 LEM strategies for both parties constitute an equilibrium.
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Proof of Lemma 2: For BY ≥ BX + t, 1a and 1b of Lemma 1 imply that Y ’s LEM
strategy is best response against X’s LEM strategy. 1c implies that X’s LEM strategy
is best response against Y ’s LEM strategy. Analogously, 2a—2c of Lemma 1 imply that
X’s and Y ’s LEM strategies are mutual best responses when BY < BX + t.
Lemma 3 All equilibria use LEM strategies.
Proof of Lemma 3: The proof is by induction on B (the number of multiples of ε that
bounds BX and BY ). For B = 1 the proposition is obviously true. Suppose that it is
true for B = K; we now prove that it holds for B = K + 1.
If BY < t, then the claim follows immediately. Otherwise, in the first step Y promises
some T ≥ t. The new situation then is t0 < 0, BX0 = BX ≤ (K + 1)ε and BY 0 =
BY − T ≤ Kε. If BX < |t0|, then by definition the parties follow LEM strategies
from that point on. Otherwise, to become the current winner X spends S > |t0|. This
results in the configuration t00 ∈ (0, S + t0], BX00 = BX0 − S = BX00 − S ≤ Kε and
BY 00 = BY 0 = BY − T ≤ Kε. Notice that if X is playing a best response, then t00 ≤ Kε,
since if X makes t00 = (K + 1) ε then X wins at a cost that with positive probability
is higher than necessary (recall that Y ’s budget was bounded by (K + 1) ε). Therefore,
X’s best response would result in t00 ≤ Kε.
Thus, following X’s move, the inductive assumption applies and Y wins iﬀ BY 00 ≥
BX00+t00 at incremental cost (from here on) of BX00+t00; X wins otherwise at incremental
cost of BY 00−t00+ε. Translating this to the original data, Y wins if BY −T ≥ BX−S+t00,
in which case its overall expenditure (from the start) will be BX − S + t00 + T , and X
wins if and only if BY − T < BX − S + t00, in which case its overall expenditure will be
max
©
BY − t00, 0
ª
+ S + ε. Observe that, subject to the constraint S ≥ |t0|, X’s winning
probability is maximized and its expected expenditure is uniquely minimized at S = |t0|,
which is exactly what is required by an LEM strategy for X. Now, going back to Y ’s
first move, this implies that Y will win iﬀ BY − T > BX + t0, at overall expense of
T + BX − |t0| − ε. Now, subject to the constraint T ≥ t, Y ’s winning probability is
maximized and its expected expenditure is uniquely minimized at T = t, which again
corresponds only to LEM strategies for Y .
This completes the proof of Proposition 4.
Proposition 5: In the small α case, party X wins in (every) equilibrium if and only if
BX ≥ BY +(m− n) ε. In any equilibrium where X wins, its total payments are bounded
above by mαB
Y
m−1 +mε.
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Proof of Proposition 5: By Proposition 2, we can determine the winner by examining
the game with only up-front payments. We then come back to bound the winner’s
payments in the game where campaign promises are also possible.
Suppose that BX ≥ BY + (m− n) ε. We show that then X has a strategy that
guarantees a win. As a symmetric argument applies to show that Y wins if BX <
BY + (m− n) ε, this implies the if and only if statement. We show that the LEM
strategy whereby in each stage of the bidding X acquires the least expensive available
smallest majority (i.e., m voters), and purchases voters who prefer Y whenever the cost
is the same, guarantees a victory to X against any bidding strategy that Y might adopt.
This implies immediately that, in equilibrium, Y will only make oﬀers if she expects X
to overbid all her oﬀers. As X bids for only the least expensive voters this can occur only
if n ≤ m. In this case X will have spend at least ε (m− n) to purchase the majority.
There are equilibrium in which X spends up to εm. In these equilibria Y bids ε for up
to n voters i for which αUi > 0, and X buys them back.
We now argue that X wins with the LEM strategy above. A “current winner” at
a point in the bidding process will refer to the party that would win if the process
terminated at that point, and an “active oﬀer” will refer to an oﬀer that would be taken
by a voter in the equilibrium of the selling game that would be played if the process
were stopped at that point. Observe that if Y is the current winner and has a sum B
committed in active oﬀers, then X has to commit at most B + (m− n) ε to become a
current winner. To see this suppose that Y is the current winner, let pY be the mth
highest active oﬀer that Y has outstanding, where we rank voters with identical oﬀers
from Y higher if they prefer Y to X, i.e., if Ui < 0. Let voter j be the target of that lth
highest oﬀer. Let pX be the highest active oﬀer that X must have in order to become
the current winner in the least expensive way, and let voter i be the target of that oﬀer.
If Uj > 0 then pX ≤ pY for otherwise, it would be cheaper for X to acquire j’s vote
instead of i’s vote. (Recall that when faced with the same oﬀers the voter sells to her
preferred party.) Since to become current winner X needs onlym active oﬀers, it follows
that its cost would be at most pXm ≤ pYm ≤ B, where pYm ≤ B since to be a current
winner Y must have at least m active oﬀers with pY being the mth highest oﬀer.
If Uj < 0 the argument is similar, but requires a little care in counting. In this case
assume that k ≤ n of the voters who prefer X have active oﬀers from Y . By the ranking
described above, these voters have an oﬀer of at least pY + ε. Now consider those voters
not receiving any of the m highest active oﬀers from Y . These include n − k voters
who prefer X and whose oﬀers from Y must be at most pY − ε. Therefore to purchase
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enough votes X needs at most
¡
pY + ε
¢
m − (n− k) ε, where pYm + kε ≤ B, since to
be a current winner Y must have at least m active oﬀers with pY being the mth highest
oﬀer and at least k voters have active oﬀers of pY + ε. Therefore
¡
pY + ε
¢
m− (n− k) ε
= pYm+ ε (m− (n− k)) ≤ B − kε+ ε (m− (n− k)) = B + ε (m− n).
This implies that, when X follows that LEM strategy, it can always outbid Y to
become the current winner. Since the bidding process must end after a bounded num-
ber of rounds, X must win. Since X must buy m − n votes, she must spend at least
max {(m− n) ε, 0}. If Y makes an oﬀer to any of the votes that X purchased, then it
would cost X more to repurchase that vote than to purchase a diﬀerent one, and after
X’s purchase of a diﬀerent vote Y will eventually lose and have to pay something, which
is worse for Y than not purchasing in the first place (by hypothesis) so in equilibrium Y
will not purchase back a vote that X purchased. If Y purchases a vote from i such that
Ui > 0 then X is indiﬀerent between purchasing this vote back at cost ε and purchasing
a diﬀerent vote from j with Uj < 0, so, as noted, there is an equilibrium where Y oﬀers
ε to some of the n ≤ m voters and X purchases them back, leading to total cost of up
to mε.
Now, let us come back to bound the payments that X makes when X wins in the
game where both up-front payments and campaign promises are possible. X can still
follow an LEM strategy, and that will still win. As Y surely loses, Y will not be making
any binding up-front payments in equilibrium. Thus, consider the ending promises that
are made by Y . It must that X has bought a least expensive majority, meaning that the
maximum price paid for any voter in this majority is at most the minimum price of the
voters not purchased. Any promises made by Y to the voters that X did not purchase
must have been made in the form of campaign promises. The highest the minimum cost
could be is then αB
Y
m−1 + ε. The claimed expression then follows directly.
Proposition 6: Party X wins if
BX −BY ≥ −
X
i
αUi/2− αUN/2 +mε and (3)
BX ≥
¯¯¯¯
mαU1
2
¯¯¯¯
−
PN
i=m+1 αUi
2
− αUN
2
+mε (4)
and party Y wins if
BX −BY ≤ −
X
i
αUi/2− αU1/2−mε and (5)
BY ≥
¯¯¯¯
mαUN
2
¯¯¯¯
+
Pm−1
i=1 αUi
2
+
αU1
2
+mε. (6)
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Proof of Proposition 6: Let us show that X has a strategy that guarantees that X
wins if (3) and (4) are satisfied. The other case is analogous.
Let us describe a strategy that X can follow to guarantee a win. Have X allocate
oﬀers in the following way. Let t be the period. X will identify a set of voters St to “
buy” that has cardinality exactly m. X will make the minimal necessary oﬀers to buy
these votes.
To complete the proof we need only describe how X should select St, and then show
that if X has followed this strategy in past periods, then X will have enough budget to
cover the required payments regardless of the strategy of Y .
Let pYi be the current oﬀer that Y has to voter i. Set this to 0 in the case where Y
has never made a viable oﬀer to the voter, or in a case where X already has the best
standing oﬀer to the voter. Similarly define pXi .
X selects to whom to make oﬀers by looking for those with that minimize the sum
of what X has to oﬀer, plus what oﬀers of Y ’s that X frees up. In particular, let St be
the set of voters than minimizes
P
i∈St 2p
Y
i − αUi. This is equivalent to choosing the m
voters that have the smallest values of
pYi −
αUi
2
.
In the case where there are some i’s that are tied under the above criterion, let X
lexicographically favor voters with lower indices. To complete the proof, we simply need
to show that this strategy is within X’s budget in every possible situation, presuming
that X has followed this strategy up to time t.21
Notice that the cost of a voter i ∈ St to X is at most£
pYi − αUi
¤+
+ ε. (7)
The expression
£
pYi − αUi
¤+
captures the fact that it could be that pYi < αUi in which
case no oﬀer is necessary.
The amount that must be oﬀered to a voter can only rise or stay constant over time,
and so if some voters were “ purchased” by X in the past and have not been subsequently
purchased by Y , then these voters are still among the cheapest m available in the current
period time and would still be selected under X’s strategy (including the lexicographic
tie-breaking).
21This implies the proposition, as it means that either Y will not respond and the game will end with
X the winner, or else X will get to move again and can again follow the same strategy. As the game
must end in a finite number of periods, this implies that X must win.
33
Let i∗ denote the most “expensive” i ∈ St in terms of the “adjusted price” pYi − αUi2 .
If there are several voters tied for this distinction, pick the one with the lowest index.
So, i∗ ∈ argmaxi∈St
©
pYi − αUi2
ª
, and let St be the complement of St union {i∗}.
Given the algorithm followed by X, we know that
pYi −
αUi
2
≤ pYi∗ −
αUi∗
2
for every i ∈ St. This can be rewritten as
pYi ≤ pYi∗ −
αUi∗
2
+
αUi
2
(8)
for each i ∈ St.
Equations (7) and (8) imply that the amount required by X to follow this strategy
at this stage is at most X
i∈St
·
pYi∗ −
αUi∗
2
− αUi
2
¸+
+mε (9)
If we can get an upper bound on the expression pYi∗ − αUi∗2 , then we have an upper
bound on how much X has to pay. So we want to maximize pYi∗ − αUi∗2 subject to the
following constraints:
(1) pYi − αUi2 ≥ pYi∗ −
αUi∗
2
for every i /∈ St,
(2) pYi ≥ αUi + pXi , and
(3)
P
i∈St p
Y
i ≤ BY .
To get an upper bound, we ignore (2), and relax (3) by replacing BY with BY =
max
n
BY ,
¯¯mαU1
2
¯¯
+
Pm
i=1 αUi
2
o
. The solution then involves spending all of B¯Y in a manner
that equalizes pYi − αUi2 with pYi∗ −
αUi∗
2
for each i /∈ St. (This is feasible due to the lower
bound imposed on BY ; it is not necessarily feasible for BY , but still gives a bound).
Thus, we end up with
pYi = x
Y ¡St¢+ αUi/2,
for each i ∈ St, where
xY (St) =
B¯Y −
P
i∈St
αUi
2
m
(10)
From (9), for X’s strategy to be feasible it is suﬃcient that
BX ≥
X
i∈St
£
xY
¡
St
¢
− αUi/2
¤+
+mε.
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Substituting for xY from (10), this becomes
BX ≥ B¯Y −
X
i∈St∪St
αUi/2 +mε.
This simplifies to
BX ≥ B¯Y −
X
i
αUi/2− αUi∗/2 +mε,
which has an upper bound when i∗ = N , and which then yields the claimed expressions
by substituting the definition of BY .
Proposition 7: For any δ > 0, there is N(δ) and ε¯ such that for all N > N(δ) and all
grids with ε ∈ (0, ε¯) the following hold.
• If BY > BX + αU¯N/2 + δ, then Y wins with probability of at least 1− δ.
• If BX > BY − αU¯N/2 + δ, then X wins with probability of at least 1− δ.
Proof of Proposition 7:
Lemma 4 Suppose that Party Y oﬀers a constant price x to all voters, such that 1 >
F (x) > 0. The least expensive way for Party X to assure itself expected share σ ∈ [0, 1]
of the vote would be oﬀering a constant price to all voters. The same is also true with
the roles reversed.
Note that we do not assume here that the constant price oﬀered by X is a multiple
of ε. If that constraint were added, then the cost to X of obtaining a share σ would be
at least as high (and might involve a diﬀerent strategy).
Proof of Lemma 4: The problem of finding bids pXi that Party X can make to assure
expected share σ at minimum cost is
min
{pXi }
X
i
pXi [1− F (x− pXi )] s.t.
X
i
1− F (x− pXi ) ≥ Nσ, pXi ≥ 0. (11)
The first order conditions to (11) can be written as
pXi f(x− pXi ) + 1− F (x− pXi )−
λ
N
f(x− pXi )− µi = 0. (12)
where λ and µi are nonnegative multipliers.
Given that the support of F is connected and f is positive on F ’s support, we have
three possible ranges for solutions to (12): one where f(x− pXi ) = 0 and F (x− pXi ) = 0,
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one where f(x − pXi ) > 0 and 0 < F (x − pXi ) < 1, and one where f(x − pXi ) = 0 and
F (x − pXi ) = 1. The first order conditions cannot be satisfied in the first case, unless
µi = 1 in which case the non-negativity constraint is binding and p
X
i = 0. However,
by hypothesis, 0 < F (x − 0), which is a contradiction of the presumption of the case
that F (x − pXi ) = 0. In the third case, for f(x − pXi ) = 0 and F (x − pXi ) = 1 to hold,
since 1 > F (x) it must be that pXi < 0. However, this cannot be a solution given the
non-negativity constraint. Thus all possible solutions must fall in the second case. In the
second case, in order to satisfy the first order conditions, it must be that pXi ≤ λN . [If
µi = 0 then this is clear since (1−F ) > 0. If µi > 0, then the constraint that pXi ≥ 0must
be binding, in which case pXi = 0 and again p
X
i ≤ λN .] For this case, since f(x− pXi ) > 0,
we rewrite (12) as
x− pXi −
1− F (x− pXi )
f(x− pXi )
− (x− λ
N
) +
µi
f(x− pXi )
= 0. (13)
Suppose that there are two solutions, pXi and p
X
j to (13) in this range. Without loss of
generality, letting zi = x− pXi > zj = x− pXj , we have
zi − 1− F (z
i)
f(zi)
− (x− λ
N
) +
µi
f(zi)
= 0 = zj − 1− F (z
j)
f(zj)
− (x− λ
N
) +
µj
f(zj)
.
Since z − (1 − F (z))/f(z) = z + (F (z)) − 1)/f(z) is increasing (in this range where
f(z) > 0), it follows that 0 = µi < µj. (Note that µi takes on only two values.) But this
implies pXj = 0 < p
X
i , which contradicts the fact that z
i > zj.
Thus we have shown that any solution to (11) necessarily has identical prices oﬀered
to all agents.
The proof for Lemma 4 with the roles reversed for the parties has (11) replaced by
min
{pYi }
X
i
pYi [F (p
Y
i − x)] s.t.
X
i
F (pYi − x) ≥ Nσ, pXi ≥ 0,
with corresponding first order conditions
pYi f(p
Y
i − x) + F (pYi − x)−
λ
N
f(pYi − x)− µi = 0.
Working through similar cases as those above, and this time using the fact that z +
F (z)/f(z) is increasing on the support of F , yields the same conclusion. ¤
Lemma 5 If (0.5+η)N [ B
X
(0.5−η)N +F
−1(0.5−η)] < BY , then Y can obtain expected share
(0.5+η) of the vote at each stage. Similarly if, (0.5+η)N [ B
Y
(0.5−η)N −F−1(0.5+η)] < BX,
then X can obtain a share of (0.5 + η) at each stage.
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Proof of Lemma 5: We show the first claim, as the second is analogous. Suppose that
it is Y ’s turn. If Y can oﬀer all voters the same price p = BX/(0.5−η)N +F−1(0.5−η),
then Y can win in one step. This is so since, by the previous claim, X’s least expensive
way of getting at least (0.5− η)N is by oﬀering the same price to all voters. A constant
price that suﬃces here is BX/(0.5 − η)N which exactly exhausts X’s budget (ignoring
the constraint that X must make oﬀers in multiples of ε, and more than exhausts it if the
constraint is taken into account). Now, since BX 0.5+η
0.5−η+(0.5+η)NF
−1(0.5−η) < BY , the
price p is feasible for Y when only (0.5 + η)N voters (or slightly more) accept it. Thus,
if p is infeasible at that stage, then there are more than (0.5 + η)N voters who would
prefer to sell to Y at that price. But this means that there is a lower price p0 < p that
gives Y an expected majority of (0.5 + η)N . Since (0.5 + η)Np0 < (0.5 + η)Np < BY ,
the price p0 is feasible. Clearly, if p0 is not a multiple of ε then for any ε small enough
there is a p00 that is slightly larger that also gives Y an expected majority of (0.5 + η)N ,
and for a small enough grid size still more than exhausts X’s budget. ¤
We now show (1) and (2) of the proposition. We concentrate on (1), as the other
case is analogous, given the lemmas above. For δ > 0, there exists suﬃciently small
η > 0 such that (0.5 + η)N [ B
X
(0.5−η)N + F
−1(0.5 − η)] < BX + αU¯N/2 + δ. Therefore, if
η is suﬃciently small, BY > BX + αU¯/2 + δ together with Lemma 5 imply that Y can
obtain an expected share of (0.5 + η). When N is made suﬃciently large (here we mean
that BX and BY increase proportionately with N), an expected share of (0.5+ η) means
an arbitrarily large probability of winning. Therefore, there exists N(δ) such that, for
N > N(δ), Y ’s winning probability is above 1− δ.
This complete the proof of Proposition 7.
Proposition 9 Suppose that UX satisfies (4) in the place of BX, and UY satisfies (6)
in the place of BY . In the large budget case, party X wins in the campaign donations
vote-buying game if
UX − UY ≤ −αUN/3 +
2
3
mε
and Y wins if
UX − UY ≤ −αU1/3−
2
3
mε.
The proof of Proposition 9 is an easy extension of the proof of Proposition 8, and is
again omitted, noting simply that noting that the above equations follow from (3) and
(5) and a maximum willingness to donate of Ui, and that
P
i αUi = α(U
X − UY ).
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